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I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the universe 
as computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work of polymath 
physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert but have not found a single citation 
and so I present this very brief summary. Wolpert proved some stunning 
impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the limits 
to inference (computation) that are so general they are independent of the device 
doing the computation, and even independent of the laws of physics, so they apply 
across computers, physics, and human behavior. They make use of Cantor's 
diagonalization, the liar paradox and worldlines to provide what may be the 
ultimate theorem in Turing Machine Theory, and seemingly provide insights into 
impossibility, incompleteness, the limits of computation, and the universe as 
computer, in all possible universes and all beings or mechanisms, generating, 
among other things, a non- quantum mechanical uncertainty principle and a proof 
of monotheism. There are obvious connections to the classic work of Chaitin, 
Solomonoff, Komolgarov and Wittgenstein and to the notion that no program (and 
thus no device) can generate a sequence (or device) with greater complexity than it 
possesses. One might say this body of work implies atheism since there cannot be 
any entity more complex than the physical universe and from the Wittgensteinian 
viewpoint, ‘more complex’ is meaningless (has no conditions of satisfaction, i.e., 
truth-maker or test). Even a ‘God’ (i.e., a ‘device’with limitless time/space and 
energy) cannot determine whether a given ‘number’ is ‘random’, nor find a certain 
way to show that a given ‘formula’, ‘theorem’ or ‘sentence’ or ‘device’ (all these 
being complex language games) is part of a particular ‘system’. 
 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from 
the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of 
Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John 
Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking 
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Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed 
Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 2nd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) 
 
 
I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the universe 
as computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work of polymath 
physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert but have not found a single citation 
and so I present this very brief article. Wolpert proved some stunning impossibility 
or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the limits to inference 
(computation) that are so general they are independent of the device doing the 
computation, and even independent of the laws of physics, so they apply across 
computers, physics, and human behavior, which he summarized thusly: “One 
cannot build a physical computer that can be assured of correctly processing 
information faster than the universe does. The results also mean that there cannot 
exist an infallible, general-purpose observation apparatus, and that there cannot be 
an infallible, general-purpose control apparatus. These results do not rely on 
systems that are inﬁnite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They 
also hold even if one uses an inﬁnitely fast, inﬁnitely dense computer, with 
computational powers greater than that of a Turing Machine.” He also published 
what seems to be the first serious work on team or collective intelligence (COIN) 
which he says puts this subject on a sound scientific footing.  Although he has 
published various versions of these over two decades in some of the most 
prestigious peer reviewed physics journals (e.g., Physica D 237: 257-81(2008)) as 
well as in NASA journals and has gotten news items in major science journals, few 
seem to have noticed and I have looked in dozens of recent books on physics, math, 
decision theory and computation without finding a reference. 
 
It is most unfortunate that almost nobody is aware of Wolpert, since his work can 
be seen as the ultimate extension of computing, thinking, inference, incompleteness, 
and undecidability, which he achieves (like many proofs in Turing machine theory) 
by extending the liar paradox and Cantors diagonalization to include all possible 
universes and all beings or mechanisms and thus may be seen as the last word not 
only on computation, but on cosmology or even deities. He achieves this extreme 
generality by partitioning the inferring universe using worldlines (i.e., in terms of 
what it does and not how it does it) so that his mathematical proofs are independent 
of any particular physical laws or computational structures in establishing the 
physical limits of inference for past, present and future and all possible calculation, 
observation and control. He notes that even in a classical universe Laplace was 
wrong about being able to perfectly predict the future (or even perfectly depict the 
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past or present) and that his impossibility results can be viewed as a “non-quantum 
mechanical uncertainty principle” (i.e., there cannot be an infallible observation or 
control device). Any universal physical device must be infinite, it can only be so at 
one moment in time, and no reality can have more than one (the “monotheism 
theorem”). Since space and time do not appear in the definition, the device can even 
be the entire universe across all time. It can be viewed as a physical analog of 
incompleteness with two inference devices rather than one self-referential device. 
As he says, “either the Hamiltonian of our universe proscribes a certain type of 
computation, or prediction complexity is unique (unlike algorithmic information 
complexity) in that there is one and only one version of it that can be applicable 
throughout our universe.” Another way to say this is that one cannot have two 
physical inference devices (computers) both capable of being asked arbitrary 
questions about the output of the other, or that the universe cannot contain a 
computer to which one can pose any arbitrary computational task, or that for any 
pair of physical inference engines, there are always binary valued questions about 
the state of the universe that cannot even be posed to at least one of them. One 
cannot build a computer that can predict an arbitrary future condition of a physical 
system before it occurs, even if the condition is from a restricted set of tasks that can 
be posed to it— that is, it cannot process information (though this is a vexed phrase, 
as many including John Searle and Rupert Read note) faster than the universe. 
 
 The computer and the arbitrary physical system it is computing do not have to be 
physically coupled and it holds regardless of the laws of physics, chaos, quantum 
mechanics, causality or light cones and even for an infinite speed of light. The 
inference device does not have to be spatially localized but can be nonlocal 
dynamical processes occurring across the entire universe. He is well aware that this 
puts the speculations of Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd etc., concerning the 
universe as computer or the limits of ”information processing”, in a new light 
(though the indices of their writings make no reference to him and another 
remarkable omission is that none of the above are mentioned by Yanofsky in his 
recent comprehensive book ‘The Outer Limits of Reason’ (see my review). Wolpert 
says he shows that ‘the universe’ cannot contain an inference device that can 
‘process information’ as fast as it can, and since he shows you cannot have a perfect 
memory nor perfect control, its past, present or future state can never be perfectly 
or completely depicted, characterized, known or copied. He also proved that no 
combination of computers with error correcting codes can overcome these 
limitations. Wolpert also notes the critical importance of the observer (“the liar”) 
and this connects us to the familiar conundrums of physics, math and language. As 
noted in my other articles I think that definitive comments on many relevant issues 
here (completeness, certainty, the nature of computation etc.) were made long ago 
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by Ludwig Wittgenstein and here is one relevant comment of Juliet Floyd on 
Wittgenstein:  
 
”He is articulating in other words a generalized form of diagonalization. The 
argument is thus generally applicable, not only to decimal expansions, but to any 
purported listing or rule-governed expression of them; it does not rely on any 
particular notational device or preferred spatial arrangements of signs. In that 
sense, Wittgenstein’s argument appeals to no picture and it is not essentially 
diagrammatical or representational, though it may be diagrammed and insofaras it 
is a logical argument, its logic may be represented formally). Like Turing’s 
arguments, it is free of a direct tie to any particular formalism. Unlike Turing’s 
arguments, it explicitly invokes the notion of a language-game and applies to (and 
presupposes) an everyday conception of the notions of rules and of the humans 
who follow them. Every line in the diagonal presentation above is conceived as an 
instruction or command, analogous to an order given to a human being...”   The 
parallels to Wolpert are obvious. 
 
However once again note that “infinite”, “compute”, “information” etc., only have 
meaning (i.e., are transitive (Wittgenstein) or have COS--Conditions of Satisfaction 
(Searle)) in specific human contexts—that is, as Searle has emphasized, they are all 
observer relative or ascribed vs intrinsically intentional. The universe apart from 
our psychology is neither finite nor infinite and cannot compute nor process 
anything. Only in our language games do our laptop or the universe compute. 
 
However not everyone is oblivious to Wolpert. Well known econometricians Koppl 
and Rosser in their famous 2002 paper “All that I have to say has already crossed 
your mind” give three theorems on the limits to rationality, prediction and control 
in economics. The first uses Wolpert’s theorem on the limits to computability to 
show some logical limits to forecasting the future. Wolpert notes that it can be 
viewed as the physical analog of Godel’s incompleteness theorem and K and R say 
that their variant can be viewed as its social science analog, though Wolpert is well 
aware of the social implications. Since Godel’s theorems are corollaries of Chaitin’s 
theorem showing algorithmic randomness (incompleteness) throughout math 
(which is just another of our symbolic systems), it seems inescapable that thinking 
(behavior) is full of impossible, random or incomplete statements and situations. 
Since we can view each of these domains as symbolic systems evolved by chance to 
make our psychology work, perhaps it should be regarded as unsurprising that they 
are not “complete”. For math, Chaitin says this ‘randomness’ (again a group of 
Language Games in Wittgenstein’s terms) shows there are limitless theorems that 
are true but unprovable—i.e., true for no reason. One should then be able to say that 
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there are limitless statements that make perfect “grammatical” sense that do not 
describe actual situations attainable in that domain. I suggest these puzzles go away 
if one considers W’s views. He wrote many notes on the issue of Godel’s Theorems, 
and the whole of his work concerns the plasticity, “incompleteness” and extreme 
context sensitivity of language, math and logic, and the recent papers of Rodych, 
Floyd and Berto are the best introduction I know of to W’s remarks on the 
foundations of mathematics and so perhaps to philosophy. 
 
K and R‘s second theorem shows possible nonconvergence for Bayesian 
(probabilistic) forecasting in infinite- dimensional space. The third shows the 
impossibility of a computer perfectly forecasting an economy with agents knowing 
its forecasting program. The astute will notice that these theorems can be seen as 
versions of the liar paradox, and the fact that we are caught in impossibilities when 
we try to calculate a system that includes ourselves has been noted by Wolpert, 
Koppl, Rosser and others in these contexts and again we have circled back to the 
puzzles of physics when the observer is involved. K&R conclude “Thus, economic 
order is partly the product of something other than calculative rationality”. 
 
Bounded rationality is now a major field in itself, the subject of thousands of papers 
and hundreds of books. And this seemingly abstruse work of Wolpert’s may have 
implications for all rationality. Of course, one must keep in mind that (as 
Wittgenstein noted) math and logic are all syntax and no semantics and they have 
nothing to tell us until connected to our life by language (i.e., by psychology) and 
so it is easy to do this in ways that are useful (meaningful or having COS) or not (no 
clear COS). 
 
Finally, one might say that many of Wolpert’s comments are restatements of the 
idea that no program (and thus no device) can generate a sequence (or device) with 
greater complexity than it possesses. There are obvious connections to the classic 
work of Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov and Wittgenstein and to the notion that 
no program (and thus no device) can generate a sequence (or device) with greater 
complexity than it possesses. One might say this body of work implies atheism since 
there cannot be any entity more complex than the physical universe and from the 
Wittgensteinian viewpoint, ‘more complex’ is meaningless (has no conditions of 
satisfaction, i.e., truth-maker or test). Even a ‘God’ (i.e., a ‘device’ with limitless 
time/space and energy) cannot determine whether a given ‘number’ is ‘random’ nor 
can find a certain way to show that a given ‘formula’, ‘theorem’ or ‘sentence’ or 
‘device’ (all these being complex language games) is part of a particular ‘system’. 
 
 
